Opinion
  Reconciliation or Awami League’s Rehabilitation?
  15-10-2026

Ali Ahmad Mabrur: Reconciliation is a recognized political concept. In countries emerging from prolonged conflict, deep political divisions or authoritarian rule, it can play an important role in restoring stability and rebuilding public trust. But how appropriate is the call for reconciliation in Bangladesh’s current political context? And can the possibility that reconciliation may be used to facilitate the political rehabilitation of the Awami League simply be dismissed?

In recent months, several members of Bangladesh’s civil society, along with various international actors, have repeatedly called for reconciliation. At first glance, the proposal may appear reasonable and constructive. Yet reconciliation is not merely about bringing political opponents to the negotiating table or urging society to forget the past and move forward. Genuine reconciliation requires an acknowledgment of the truth, accountability for wrongdoing, justice for victims and credible guarantees that similar abuses will not recur. Calls for reconciliation that overlook these fundamental requirements risk creating an avenue for evading responsibility rather than building national unity.

The most important question, therefore, is what the Awami League itself wants. Is the party prepared to confront allegations of repression, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, political persecution and the systematic denial of democratic rights during its years in power? Has it demonstrated any genuine willingness to acknowledge its responsibility to those who lost their lives during the July uprising and to their bereaved families? To date, the party has not made any clear, credible and institutional expression of remorse that could help establish the trust necessary for national reconciliation. On the contrary, attempts to portray the mass uprising as a conspiracy raise serious questions. How can a meaningful basis for reconciliation be established with a political force that appears unwilling to acknowledge the historical reality of the uprising or the public grievances that fueled it?

National reconciliation cannot be a one-sided exercise. Any process that sidelines the experiences of those who suffered persecution, the demands of families who lost their loved ones and the grievances of people subjected to years of political repression would amount to another injustice against the victims. The July uprising was not simply the fall of a government. It was a collective rejection of authoritarian rule, the absence of accountability and the systematic erosion of citizens’ rights. Following the uprising, the government formed during the transition was expected to make state institutions accountable and prevent the re-emergence of authoritarianism. Against this backdrop, it is reasonable to question how realistic it is to prioritize reconciliation before adequate judicial proceedings and accountability have taken place.

There are further developments that warrant concern. Reports of Awami League activists’ activities in different parts of the country, allegations of sporadic violence and incidents involving crude bombs have added to the political uncertainty. Such instances cannot be assessed entirely in isolation from the broader political context.

The recent detention of two former military officers, reportedly in connection with allegations that they provided military training to Awami League activists despite the suspension of the party’s activities, as well as allegations concerning their continued communications with the party, has also attracted attention. However, if substantiated, they would raise serious concerns not merely about political rivalry but also about national security and the prospects for a peaceful democratic transition.

The Awami League’s reported advance announcement that it intends to return to Bangladesh in December is another development that merits scrutiny. There is nothing inherently unusual about a political party seeking to return to the political arena. The fundamental question, however, is the political and moral basis on which such a return would be pursued. An announcement of political re-entry, by itself, cannot restore public confidence without a credible acknowledgment of past wrongdoing, respect for judicial proceedings and an unequivocal commitment to rejecting violence and authoritarian practices.

Developments on the international front also deserve consideration. Reports of the harassment of Dr Muhammad Yunus in New York, attempts to damage the international standing of Bangladesh’s interim government and allegations that lobbying firms have been engaged abroad to challenge the credibility of proceedings related to the July uprising have raised questions. The motives behind these incidents and the roles of the parties concerned must be assessed on the basis of verifiable evidence. Anyone dissatisfied with a court verdict has access to lawful avenues of appeal and review. Attempts to discredit judicial authority, conduct campaigns intended to delegitimize legal proceedings internationally or exert political pressure, however, risk undermining the environment necessary for justice.

This is where the central dilemma in the reconciliation debate becomes apparent. If the political force being invited to reconcile has yet to demonstrate a credible willingness to acknowledge its past, respect judicial proceedings and make an unequivocal commitment to democratic principles, what exactly would reconciliation achieve? Would it represent a genuine effort to heal the nation’s political wounds, or would it provide a more acceptable narrative for facilitating the Awami League’s political rehabilitation?

Admittedly, any decision concerning a party’s future political participation must take account of the law, evidence, constitutional rights and due process. However, the right to participate in politics and exemption from accountability for past wrongdoing are two entirely different matters. A path back to democratic politics may exist, but that path cannot serve as a substitute for accountability.

Bangladesh’s greatest challenge now is to translate the aspirations of the July uprising into meaningful institutional and political reforms. This requires an independent judiciary, effective accountability mechanisms, an end to political violence and the protection of every citizen’s rights. If reconciliation can contribute to these objectives, it deserves serious consideration. But if it means forgetting the past before the truth has been established, disregarding victims’ demands for justice or creating conditions for the Awami League’s political return without accountability, it would not constitute national reconciliation. It would amount to a compromise with justice.

Reconciliation can be sustainable only when the parties concerned are prepared to confront the truth. Without remorse, an acknowledgment of responsibility and accountability, calls for reconciliation risk becoming little more than political rhetoric. Bangladesh does not need a form of reconciliation that obscures the history of the mass uprising. It needs a new political settlement that ensures no party, individual or institution can once again deprive the people of their rights and expect to escape accountability.